Species-specific emergence of H7 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus is driven by intrahost selection differences between chickens and ducks.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) cause severe hemorrhagic disease in terrestrial poultry and are a threat to the poultry industry, wild life, and human health. HPAIVs arise from low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs), which circulate in wild aquatic birds. HPAIV emergence is thought to occur in poultry and not wild aquatic birds, but the reason for this species-restriction is not known. We hypothesized that, due to species-specific tropism and replication, intrahost HPAIV selection is favored in poultry and disfavored in wild aquatic birds. We tested this hypothesis by co-inoculating chickens, representative of poultry, and ducks, representative of wild aquatic birds, with a mixture of H7N7 HPAIV and LPAIV, mimicking HPAIV emergence in an experimental setting. Virus selection was monitored in swabs and tissues by RT-qPCR and immunostaining of differential N-terminal epitope tags that were added to the hemagglutinin protein. HPAIV was selected in four of six co-inoculated chickens, whereas LPAIV remained the major population in co-inoculated ducks on the long-term, despite detection of infectious HPAIV in tissues at early time points. Collectively, our data support the hypothesis that HPAIVs are more likely to be selected at the intrahost level in poultry than in wild aquatic birds and point towards species-specific differences in HPAIV and LPAIV tropism and replication levels as possible explanations.

Characterization of A/H7 influenza virus global antigenic diversity and key determinants in the hemagglutinin globular head mediating A/H7N9 antigenic evolution.

IMPORTANCE: A/H7 avian influenza viruses cause outbreaks in poultry globally, resulting in outbreaks with significant socio-economical impact and zoonotic risks. Occasionally, poultry vaccination programs have been implemented to reduce the burden of these viruses, which might result in an increased immune pressure accelerating antigenic evolution. In fact, evidence for antigenic diversification of A/H7 influenza viruses exists, posing challenges to pandemic preparedness and the design of vaccination strategies efficacious against drifted variants. Here, we performed a comprehensive analysis of the global antigenic diversity of A/H7 influenza viruses and identified the main substitutions in the hemagglutinin responsible for antigenic evolution in A/H7N9 viruses isolated between 2013 and 2019. The A/H7 antigenic map and knowledge of the molecular determinants of their antigenic evolution add value to A/H7 influenza virus surveillance programs, the design of vaccines and vaccination strategies, and pandemic preparedness.

Continued adaptation of A/H2N2 viruses during pandemic circulation in humans.

Influenza A viruses of the H2N2 subtype sparked a pandemic in 1957 and circulated in humans until 1968. Because A/H2N2 viruses still circulate in wild birds worldwide and human population immunity is low, the transmissibility of six avian A/H2N2 viruses was investigated in the ferret model. None of the avian A/H2N2 viruses was transmitted between ferrets, suggesting that their pandemic risk may be low. The transmissibility, receptor binding preference and haemagglutinin (HA) stability of human A/H2N2 viruses were also investigated. Human A/H2N2 viruses from 1957 and 1958 bound to human-type α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors, but the 1958 virus had a more stable HA, indicating adaptation to replication and spread in the new host. This increased stability was caused by a previously unknown stability substitution G205S in the 1958 H2N2 HA, which became fixed in A/H2N2 viruses after 1958. Although individual substitutions were identified that affected the HA receptor binding and stability properties, they were not found to have a substantial effect on transmissibility of A/H2N2 viruses via the air in the ferret model. Our data demonstrate that A/H2N2 viruses continued to adapt during the first year of pandemic circulation in humans, similar to what was previously shown for the A/H1N1pdm09 virus.

A Dutch highly pathogenic H5N6 avian influenza virus showed remarkable tropism for extra-respiratory organs and caused severe disease but was not transmissible via air in the ferret model.

Continued circulation of A/H5N1 influenza viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage in poultry has resulted in the diversification in multiple genetic and antigenic clades. Since 2009, clade 2.3.4.4 hemagglutinin (HA) containing viruses harboring the internal and neuraminidase (NA) genes of other avian influenza A viruses have been detected. As a result, various HA-NA combinations, such as A/H5N1, A/H5N2, A/H5N3, A/H5N5, A/H5N6, and A/H5N8 have been identified. As of January 2023, 83 humans have been infected with A/H5N6 viruses, thereby posing an apparent risk for public health. Here, as part of a risk assessment, the in vitro and in vivo characterization of A/H5N6 A/black-headed gull/Netherlands/29/2017 is described. This A/H5N6 virus was not transmitted between ferrets via the air but was of unexpectedly high pathogenicity compared to other described A/H5N6 viruses. The virus replicated and caused severe lesions not only in respiratory tissues but also in multiple extra-respiratory tissues, including brain, liver, pancreas, spleen, lymph nodes, and adrenal gland. Sequence analyses demonstrated that the well-known mammalian adaptation substitution D701N was positively selected in almost all ferrets. In the in vitro experiments, no other known viral phenotypic properties associated with mammalian adaptation or increased pathogenicity were identified. The lack of transmission via the air and the absence of mammalian adaptation markers suggest that the public health risk of this virus is low. The high pathogenicity of this virus in ferrets could not be explained by the known mammalian pathogenicity factors and should be further studied. IMPORTANCE Avian influenza A/H5 viruses can cross the species barrier and infect humans. These infections can have a fatal outcome, but fortunately these influenza A/H5 viruses do not spread between humans. However, the extensive circulation and reassortment of A/H5N6 viruses in poultry and wild birds warrant risk assessments of circulating strains. Here an in-depth characterization of the properties of an avian A/H5N6 influenza virus isolated from a black-headed gull in the Netherlands was performed in vitro and in vivo, in ferrets. The virus was not transmissible via the air but caused severe disease and spread to extra-respiratory organs. Apart from the detection in ferrets of a mutation that increased virus replication, no other mammalian adaptation phenotypes were identified. Our results suggest that the risk of this avian A/H5N6 virus for public health is low. The underlying reasons for the high pathogenicity of this virus are unexplained and should be further studied.

Evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza A virus in the central nervous system of ferrets.

Central nervous system (CNS) disease is the most common extra-respiratory tract complication of influenza A virus infections in humans. Remarkably, zoonotic highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus infections are more often associated with CNS disease than infections with seasonal influenza viruses. Evolution of avian influenza viruses has been extensively studied in the context of respiratory infections, but evolutionary processes in CNS infections remain poorly understood. We have previously observed that the ability of HPAI A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) virus to replicate in and spread throughout the CNS varies widely between individual ferrets. Based on these observations, we sought to understand the impact of entrance into and replication within the CNS on the evolutionary dynamics of virus populations. First, we identified and characterized three substitutions-PB1 E177G and A652T and NP I119M - detected in the CNS of a ferret infected with influenza A/Indonesia/5/2005 (H5N1) virus that developed a severe meningo-encephalitis. We found that some of these substitutions, individually or collectively, resulted in increased polymerase activity in vitro. Nevertheless, in vivo, the virus bearing the CNS-associated mutations retained its capacity to infect the CNS but showed reduced dispersion to other anatomical sites. Analyses of viral diversity in the nasal turbinate and olfactory bulb revealed the lack of a genetic bottleneck acting on virus populations accessing the CNS via this route. Furthermore, virus populations bearing the CNS-associated mutations showed signs of positive selection in the brainstem. These features of dispersion to the CNS are consistent with the action of selective processes, underlining the potential for H5N1 viruses to adapt to the CNS.

Contribution of Neuraminidase to the Efficacy of Seasonal Split Influenza Vaccines in the Ferret Model.

Seasonal influenza vaccination takes into account primarily hemagglutinin (HA)-specific neutralizing antibody responses. However, the accumulation of substitutions in the antigenic regions of HA (i.e., antigenic drift) occasionally results in a mismatch between the vaccine and circulating strains. To prevent poor vaccine performance, we investigated whether an antigenically matched neuraminidase (NA) may compensate for reduced vaccine efficacy due to a mismatched HA. Ferrets were vaccinated twice with adjuvanted split inactivated influenza vaccines containing homologous HA and NA (vacH3N2), only homologous HA (vacH3N1), only homologous NA (vacH1N2), heterologous HA and NA (vacH1N1), or phosphate-buffered saline (vacPBS), followed by challenge with H3N2 virus (A/Netherlands/16190/1968). Ferrets vaccinated with homologous HA (vacH3N2 and vacH3N1) displayed minimum fever and weight loss compared to vacH1N1 and vacPBS ferrets, while ferrets vaccinated with NA-matched vacH1N2 displayed intermediate fever and weight loss. Vaccination with vacH1N2 further led to a reduction in virus shedding from the nose and undetectable virus titers in the lower respiratory tract, similarly to when the homologous vacH3N2 was used. Some protection was observed upon vacH1N1 vaccination, but this was not comparable to that observed for vacH1N2, again highlighting the important role of NA in vaccine-induced protection. These results illustrate that NA antibodies can prevent severe disease caused by influenza virus infection and that an antigenically matched NA in seasonal vaccines might prevent lower respiratory tract complications. This underlines the importance of considering NA during the yearly vaccine strain selection process, which may be particularly beneficial in seasons when the HA component of the vaccine is mismatched. IMPORTANCE Despite the availability of vaccines, influenza virus infections continue to cause substantial morbidity and mortality in humans. Currently available influenza vaccines take primarily the hemagglutinin (HA) into account, but the highly variable nature of this protein as a result of antigenic drift has led to a recurrent decline in vaccine effectiveness. While the protective effect of neuraminidase (NA) antibodies has been highlighted by several studies, there are no requirements with regard to quantity or quality of NA in licensed vaccines, and NA immunity remains largely unexploited. Since antigenic changes in HA and NA are thought to occur asynchronously, NA immunity could compensate for reduced vaccine efficacy when drift in HA occurs. By matching and mismatching the HA and NA components of monovalent split inactivated vaccines, we demonstrated the potential of NA immunity to protect against disease, virus replication in the lower respiratory tract, and virus shedding in the ferret model.

Small quantities of respiratory syncytial virus RNA only in large droplets around infants hospitalized with acute respiratory infections.

BACKGROUND: Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is a major cause of respiratory tract infections in young children. The predominant transmission routes for RSV are still a matter of debate. Specifically, it remains unclear if RSV can be transmitted through the air and what the correlation is between the amount of RSV in nasopharynx samples and in the air. METHODS: The amount of RSV in the air around hospitalized RSV infected infants in single-patient rooms was quantified using a six-stage Andersen cascade impactor that collects and fractionates aerosols and droplets according to size. RSV shedding in the nasopharynx of patients was followed longitudinally by quantifying RSV RNA levels and infectious virus in nasopharyngeal aspirates. Nose and throat swabs of parents and swabs of the patient's bedrail and a datalogger were also collected. RESULTS: Patients remained RSV positive during the air sampling period and infectious virus was isolated up to 9 days post onset of symptoms. In three out of six patients, low levels of RSV RNA, but no infectious virus, were recovered from impactor collection plates that capture large droplets > 7 µm. For four of these patients, one or both parents were also positive for RSV. All surface swabs were RSV-negative. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the prolonged detection of infectious RSV in the nasopharynx of patients, only small amounts of RSV RNA were collected from the air around three out of six patients, which were primarily contained in large droplets which do not remain suspended in the air for long periods of time.

Comparison of three air samplers for the collection of four nebulized respiratory viruses - Collection of respiratory viruses from air.

Viral respiratory tract infections are a leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide. Unfortunately, the transmission routes and shedding kinetics of respiratory viruses remain poorly understood. Air sampling techniques to quantify infectious viruses in the air are indispensable to improve intervention strategies to control and prevent spreading of respiratory viruses. Here, the collection of infectious virus with the six-stage Andersen cascade impactor was optimized with semi-solid gelatin as collection surface. Subsequently, the collection efficiency of the cascade impactor, the SKC BioSampler, and an in-house developed electrostatic precipitator was compared. In an in vitro set-up, influenza A virus, human metapneumovirus, parainfluenza virus type 3, and respiratory syncytial virus were nebulized and the amount of collected infectious virus and viral RNA was quantified with each air sampler. Whereas only low amounts of virus were collected using the electrostatic precipitator, high amounts were collected with the BioSampler and cascade impactor. The BioSampler allowed straight-forward sampling in liquid medium, whereas the more laborious cascade impactor allowed size fractionation of virus-containing particles. Depending on the research question, either the BioSampler or the cascade impactor can be applied in laboratory and field settings, such as hospitals to gain more insight into the transmission routes of respiratory viruses.

SARS-CoV-2 Neutralizing Human Antibodies Protect Against Lower Respiratory Tract Disease in a Hamster Model.

Effective clinical intervention strategies for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) are urgently needed. Although several clinical trials have evaluated use of convalescent plasma containing virus-neutralizing antibodies, levels of neutralizing antibodies are usually not assessed and the effectiveness has not been proven. We show that hamsters treated prophylactically with a 1:2560 titer of human convalescent plasma or a 1:5260 titer of monoclonal antibody were protected against weight loss, had a significant reduction of virus replication in the lungs, and showed reduced pneumonia. Interestingly, this protective effect was lost with a titer of 1:320 of convalescent plasma. These data highlight the importance of screening plasma donors for high levels of neutralizing antibodies. Our data show that prophylactic administration of high levels of neutralizing antibody, either monoclonal or from convalescent plasma, prevent severe SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia in a hamster model, and could be used as an alternative or complementary to other antiviral treatments for COVID-19.

SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 are transmitted through the air between ferrets over more than one meter distance.

SARS-CoV-2 emerged in late 2019 and caused a pandemic, whereas the closely related SARS-CoV was contained rapidly in 2003. Here, an experimental set-up is used to study transmission of SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 through the air between ferrets over more than a meter distance. Both viruses cause a robust productive respiratory tract infection resulting in transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to two of four indirect recipient ferrets and SARS-CoV to all four. A control pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus also transmits efficiently. Serological assays confirm all virus transmission events. Although the experiments do not discriminate between transmission via small aerosols, large droplets and fomites, these results demonstrate that SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 can remain infectious while traveling through the air. Efficient virus transmission between ferrets is in agreement with frequent SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms. Although the evidence for virus transmission via the air between humans under natural conditions is absent or weak for SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2, ferrets may represent a sensitive model to study interventions aimed at preventing virus transmission.

Hemagglutinin Traits Determine Transmission of Avian A/H10N7 Influenza Virus between Mammals.

In 2014, an outbreak of avian A/H10N7 influenza virus occurred among seals along North-European coastal waters, significantly impacting seal populations. Here, we examine the cross-species transmission and mammalian adaptation of this influenza A virus, revealing changes in the hemagglutinin surface protein that increase stability and receptor binding. The seal A/H10N7 virus was aerosol or respiratory droplet transmissible between ferrets. Compared with avian H10 hemagglutinin, seal H10 hemagglutinin showed stronger binding to the human-type sialic acid receptor, with preferential binding to α2,6-linked sialic acids on long extended branches. In X-ray structures, changes in the 220-loop of the receptor-binding pocket caused similar interactions with human receptor as seen for pandemic strains. Two substitutions made seal H10 hemagglutinin more stable than avian H10 hemagglutinin and similar to human hemagglutinin. Consequently, identification of avian-origin influenza viruses across mammals appears critical to detect influenza A viruses posing a major threat to humans and other mammals.

SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted via contact and via the air between ferrets.

SARS-CoV-2, a coronavirus that emerged in late 2019, has spread rapidly worldwide, and information about the modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 among humans is critical to apply appropriate infection control measures and to slow its spread. Here we show that SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted efficiently via direct contact and via the air (via respiratory droplets and/or aerosols) between ferrets, 1 to 3 days and 3 to 7 days after exposure respectively. The pattern of virus shedding in the direct contact and indirect recipient ferrets is similar to that of the inoculated ferrets and infectious virus is isolated from all positive animals, showing that ferrets are productively infected via either route. This study provides experimental evidence of robust transmission of SARS-CoV-2 via the air, supporting the implementation of community-level social distancing measures currently applied in many countries in the world and informing decisions on infection control measures in healthcare settings.

Comparative pathogenesis of COVID-19, MERS, and SARS in a nonhuman primate model.

The current pandemic coronavirus, severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was recently identified in patients with an acute respiratory syndrome, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). To compare its pathogenesis with that of previously emerging coronaviruses, we inoculated cynomolgus macaques with SARS-CoV-2 or Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV and compared the pathology and virology with historical reports of SARS-CoV infections. In SARS-CoV-2-infected macaques, virus was excreted from nose and throat in the absence of clinical signs and detected in type I and II pneumocytes in foci of diffuse alveolar damage and in ciliated epithelial cells of nasal, bronchial, and bronchiolar mucosae. In SARS-CoV infection, lung lesions were typically more severe, whereas they were milder in MERS-CoV infection, where virus was detected mainly in type II pneumocytes. These data show that SARS-CoV-2 causes COVID-19-like disease in macaques and provides a new model to test preventive and therapeutic strategies.

Influenza A viruses are transmitted via the air from the nasal respiratory epithelium of ferrets.

Human influenza A viruses are known to be transmitted via the air from person to person. It is unknown from which anatomical site of the respiratory tract influenza A virus transmission occurs. Here, pairs of genetically tagged and untagged influenza A/H1N1, A/H3N2 and A/H5N1 viruses that are transmissible via the air are used to co-infect donor ferrets via the intranasal and intratracheal routes to cause an upper and lower respiratory tract infection, respectively. In all transmission cases, we observe that the viruses in the recipient ferrets are of the same genotype as the viruses inoculated intranasally, demonstrating that they are expelled from the upper respiratory tract of ferrets rather than from trachea or the lower airways. Moreover, influenza A viruses that are transmissible via the air preferentially infect ferret and human nasal respiratory epithelium. These results indicate that virus replication in the upper respiratory tract, the nasal respiratory epithelium in particular, of donors is a driver for transmission of influenza A viruses via the air.

Lack of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Transmission in Rabbits.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) transmission from dromedaries to humans has resulted in major outbreaks in the Middle East. Although some other livestock animal species have been shown to be susceptible to MERS-CoV, it is not fully understood why the spread of the virus in these animal species has not been observed in the field. In this study, we used rabbits to further characterize the transmission potential of MERS-CoV. In line with the presence of MERS-CoV receptor in the rabbit nasal epithelium, high levels of viral RNA were shed from the nose following virus inoculation. However, unlike MERS-CoV-infected dromedaries, these rabbits did not develop clinical manifestations including nasal discharge and did shed only limited amounts of infectious virus from the nose. Consistently, no transmission by contact or airborne routes was observed in rabbits. Our data indicate that despite relatively high viral RNA levels produced, low levels of infectious virus are excreted in the upper respiratory tract of rabbits as compared to dromedary camels, thus resulting in a lack of viral transmission.

Co-circulation of genetically distinct highly pathogenic avian influenza A clade 2.3.4.4 (H5N6) viruses in wild waterfowl and poultry in Europe and East Asia, 2017-18.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were first introduced into Europe in late 2014 and re-introduced in late 2016, following detections in Asia and Russia. In contrast to the 2014-15 H5N8 wave, there was substantial local virus amplification in wild birds in Europe in 2016-17 and associated wild bird mortality, with evidence for occasional gene exchange with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Since December 2017, several European countries have again reported events or outbreaks with HPAI H5N6 reassortant viruses in both wild birds and poultry, respectively. Previous phylogenetic studies have shown that the two earliest incursions of HPAI H5N8 viruses originated in Southeast Asia and subsequently spread to Europe. In contrast, this study indicates that recent HPAI H5N6 viruses evolved from the H5N8 2016-17 viruses during 2017 by reassortment of a European HPAI H5N8 virus and wild host reservoir LPAI viruses. The genetic and phenotypic differences between these outbreaks and the continuing detections of HPAI viruses in Europe are a cause of concern for both animal and human health. The current co-circulation of potentially zoonotic HPAI and LPAI virus strains in Asia warrants the determination of drivers responsible for the global spread of Asian lineage viruses and the potential threat they pose to public health.

Effects of pre-existing orthopoxvirus-specific immunity on the performance of Modified Vaccinia virus Ankara-based influenza vaccines.

The replication-deficient orthopoxvirus modified vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA) is a promising vaccine vector against various pathogens and has an excellent safety record. However, pre-existing vector-specific immunity is frequently suggested to be a drawback of MVA-based vaccines. To address this issue, mice were vaccinated with MVA-based influenza vaccines in the presence or absence of orthopoxvirus-specific immunity. Importantly, protective efficacy of an MVA-based influenza vaccine against a homologous challenge was not impaired in the presence of orthopoxvirus-specific pre-existing immunity. Nonetheless, orthopoxvirus-specific pre-existing immunity reduced the induction of antigen-specific antibodies under specific conditions and completely prevented induction of antigen-specific T cell responses by rMVA-based vaccination. Notably, antibodies induced by vaccinia virus vaccination, both in mice and humans, were not capable of neutralizing MVA. Thus, when using rMVA-based vaccines it is important to consider the main correlate of protection induced by the vaccine, the vaccine dose and the orthopoxvirus immune status of vaccine recipients.

Human Clade 2.3.4.4 A/H5N6 Influenza Virus Lacks Mammalian Adaptation Markers and Does Not Transmit via the Airborne Route between Ferrets.

Since their emergence in 1997, A/H5N1 influenza viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage have diversified in multiple genetic and antigenic clades upon continued circulation in poultry in several countries in Eurasia and Africa. Since 2009, reassortant viruses carrying clade 2.3.4.4 hemagglutinin (HA) and internal and neuraminidase (NA) genes of influenza A viruses of different avian origin have been detected, yielding various HA-NA combinations, such as A/H5N1, A/H5N2, A/H5N3, A/H5N5, A/H5N6, and A/H5N8. Previous studies reported on the low pathogenicity and lack of airborne transmission of A/H5N2 and A/H5N8 viruses in the ferret model. However, although A/H5N6 viruses are the only clade 2.3.4.4 viruses that crossed the species barrier and infected humans, the risk they pose for human health remains poorly characterized. Here, the characterization of A/H5N6 A/Guangzhou/39715/2014 virus in vitro and in ferrets is described. This A/H5N6 virus possessed high polymerase activity, mediated by the E627K substitution in the PB2 protein, which corresponds to only one biological trait out of the three that were previously shown to confer airborne transmissibility to A/H5N1 viruses between ferrets. This might explain its lack of airborne transmission between ferrets. After intranasal inoculation, A/H5N6 virus replicated to high titers in the respiratory tracts of ferrets and was excreted for at least 6 days. Moreover, A/H5N6 virus caused severe pneumonia in ferrets upon intratracheal inoculation. Thus, A/H5N6 virus causes a more severe disease in ferrets than previously investigated clade 2.3.4.4 viruses, but our results demonstrate that the risk from airborne spread is currently low. IMPORTANCE Avian influenza A viruses are a threat to human health, as they cross the species barrier and infect humans occasionally, often with severe outcome. The antigenic and genetic diversity of A/H5 viruses from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage is increasing, due to continued circulation and reassortment in poultry, posing a constant risk for public health and requiring regular risk assessments. Here we performed an in-depth characterization of the properties of the newly emerged zoonotic A/H5N6 virus in vitro and in ferrets. The lack of airborne transmission in the ferret model indicates that A/H5N6 virus does not pose a direct public health threat, despite the fact that it can replicate to high titers throughout the respiratory tracts of ferrets and cause more severe disease than other clade 2.3.4.4 viruses.

Mutations Driving Airborne Transmission of A/H5N1 Virus in Mammals Cause Substantial Attenuation in Chickens only when combined.

A/H5N1 influenza viruses pose a threat to human and animal health. A fully avian A/H5N1 influenza virus was previously shown to acquire airborne transmissibility between ferrets upon accumulation of five or six substitutions that affected three traits: polymerase activity, hemagglutinin stability and receptor binding. Here, the impact of these traits on A/H5N1 virus replication, tissue tropism, pathogenesis and transmission was investigated in chickens. The virus containing all substitutions associated with transmission in mammals was highly attenuated in chickens. However, single substitutions that affect polymerase activity, hemagglutinin stability and receptor binding generally had a small or negligible impact on virus replication, morbidity and mortality. A virus carrying two substitutions in the receptor-binding site was attenuated, although its tissue tropism in chickens was not affected. This data indicate that an A/H5N1 virus that is airborne-transmissible between mammals is unlikely to emerge in chickens, although individual mammalian adaptive substitutions have limited impact on viral fitness in chickens.

Limited airborne transmission of H7N9 influenza A virus between ferrets.

Wild waterfowl form the main reservoir of influenza A viruses, from which transmission occurs directly or indirectly to various secondary hosts, including humans. Direct avian-to-human transmission has been observed for viruses of subtypes A(H5N1), A(H7N2), A(H7N3), A(H7N7), A(H9N2) and A(H10N7) upon human exposure to poultry, but a lack of sustained human-to-human transmission has prevented these viruses from causing new pandemics. Recently, avian A(H7N9) viruses were transmitted to humans, causing severe respiratory disease and deaths in China. Because transmission via respiratory droplets and aerosols (hereafter referred to as airborne transmission) is the main route for efficient transmission between humans, it is important to gain an insight into airborne transmission of the A(H7N9) virus. Here we show that although the A/Anhui/1/2013 A(H7N9) virus harbours determinants associated with human adaptation and transmissibility between mammals, its airborne transmissibility in ferrets is limited, and it is intermediate between that of typical human and avian influenza viruses. Multiple A(H7N9) virus genetic variants were transmitted. Upon ferret passage, variants with higher avian receptor binding, higher pH of fusion, and lower thermostability were selected, potentially resulting in reduced transmissibility. This A(H7N9) virus outbreak highlights the need for increased understanding of the determinants of efficient airborne transmission of avian influenza viruses between mammals.